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A Probability Model for Strategic Bidding
on The Price is Right
Paul H. Kvam∗
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Richmond

Abstract
The TV game show The Price is Right features a bidding auction called
“Contestants’ Row” that rewards the player (out of 4) who bids closest to an
item’s value without overbidding. This paper considers ways in which the players can maximize their win probability based on their bidding order. We consider marginal strategies in which players assume their opponents are bidding
their perceived value of the merchandise. Each player has available to them the
information provided by the bids that preceded their own. We consider conditional strategies in which players adjust their bids knowing other players are
using strategies. The last bidder has a large advantage in both scenarios due to
receiving the most information from opposing players and being able to bid the
minimal amount over an opponent’s bid without incurring extra risk. Finally,
we measure how a player’s confidence can affect their winning probability.

Keywords: Auction; Marginal strategy; Normal distribution; Order statistics;
Simulation study.
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Introduction

The Price Is Right (TPiR) is a well-known game show that has been running on
American television since 1956. Over the course of 60 years, its hosts have included
Bill Cullen, Bob Barker, and Drew Carey. The show features several games in which
contestants from the audience compete to win prizes by guessing the retail price of
some featured merchandise. In this paper, we concentrate on the “Items up for
bid” segments, the most commonly played game in which four contestants from the
audience guess the value of a piece of merchandise, and the bidder who is closest
without going over the actual value wins the merchandise. This is a particular
bidding scenario that will motivate players to consider underbidding in order to
avoid having their bid invalidated, but also allows them to bid a value immediately
above a previous bid if they feel that bid is under the value of the merchandise.

1.1

Background

Game theory has provided a helpful stochastic framework for auction bidding optimization [9] but studies do not consider settings such as this one where overbidding
eliminates the player in that game. In general, most games are symmetric, where
each player’s chance of winning is determined by strategy. In this case, bid order
imposes a unique asymmetry. Unlike first-price auctions or independent private
value auctions, the information advantage increases from the first bidder to the last,
while the overbid penalty affects all the players, but not equally.
While this article keeps the focus on the probability models that show us how
to characterize and optimize player bids, Berk et al. [3] provided the first comprehensive study of bidding behavior on TPiR and considered simple rules for rational bidders. Based on basic principles of rational bidding, they found contestants’
strategies appeared to be suboptimal. From bidding data recorded during the 1994
season of TPiR, their research shows unequivocally that it is advantageous to bid
last, which may come at no surprise. Specifically, they found that all four players
ended up overbidding in 13% of games, and in 42% of the games, all four players
bid below the actual value. While the last bidder was the most frequent winner,
they argue that all players failed to bid rationally nearly half the time.
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Prior to this study, Bennett and Hickman [1] investigated data from Berk [2]
and identified rational bids for the fourth player (bidding one dollar more than a
previous bidder or bidding one dollar). They found suboptimal bidding occurred
more frequently in earlier games and postulated that players learned how to bid
optimally through game playing experience.
Estelami [4] expanded on the research of Berk et al. [3], and studied the impact of product-related factors on the players’ understanding of different product
categories. Healy and Noussair [5] conducted an experimental study that showed
similar suboptimal bidding behavior to that found in Berk et al. [9]. Lee et al. [8]
used the bids of the individual players to construct an aggregate bid that is superior
to estimates of individual players. Holbrook [7] considers fundamental relationships
between the bidding behavior of the players and the kinds of merchandise that is
up for auction, and specifically the way television (TPiR in particular) affects that
relationship.
Mendes and Morrison [10] present optimal strategies for symmetric games (each
player has equal footing), including those where overbidding disqualifies the bidder.
Although they consider a game that is similar to TPiR in one of their examples,
it does not reflect the sequential bidding aspect of Contestants’ Row, where more
information is available to players who bid later. In this paper, our interest is solely
on how the auction-winning probability is affected by different strategies of the four
players, where the game is not symmetric.

1.2

Marginal versus Conditional Strategy

In Section 3, we introduce a marginal strategy for bidding. Marginal strategies
assume each player maximizes their chance of winning without consideration of
player bids that follow their own. While this strategy will likely be ineffectual
(except for Player 4), it serves as a building block for more realistic strategies. We
introduce conditional strategies in Section 4 for which players use information from
previous player bids and also seek to maximize winning probability by considering
possible bids by players that follow them. We outline the difference between the
two strategies from Sections 3 and 4 in a simple example.
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1.3

Example

Four players are bidding on Contestants’ Row. The first player bids $820, and the
next player bids $850. Suppose Player 3 believes the value of merchandise up for
bid is $800. What is the best bidding strategy for Player 3? If Player 3 uses a
marginal strategy, they do not consider the potential bids by Player 4 and we will
show the marginal strategy is to bid one dollar because it maximizes their chance of
winning among the three bids, according to Player 3’s belief. Of course, this bid is
not optimal, because Player 4 can eliminate Player 3 from this auction by bidding
two dollars.
The conditional strategy takes this into consideration. Player 3 can increase
their chance of winning (according to their belief) by shrinking their bid below $800.
However, if they bid too far below that value, they increase the risk that Player 4
will bid a dollar more, which will greatly diminish their chance of winning. Player
3 must adopt a defensive strategy knowing Player 4 has this unique advantage. For
this case (see Section 4), we use simulation to find that Player 3 maximizes their
winning probability by bidding 4% below their perceived value. In this example,
Player 3 would bid $768.

1.4

Outline of Paper

Our primary interest is in the TPiR bidding model described above for the game
called “Contestants’ Row”. However, in Section 2 we will first consider a simpler
model with two bidders that will show the ramifications of the overbidding penalty.
Section 3 describes the marginal strategies, and these serve as a foundation for the
more-realistic conditional strategies described in Section 4. Some of the conditional
strategies are determined through Monte Carlo simulation based on simple stochastic models that assume players generate independent merchandise assessments. In
Section 5, we consider the effect of player uncertainty on bidding using a belief
distribution.
We may treat each player’s guess of the merchandise value as a random variable:
let Xi be estimated value for the merchandise by Player i, where i = 1, 2, 3, 4. For
all scenarios, we assume the actual unknown value of the merchandise is η and that
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V (Xi ) = σ 2 < ∞ for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. In scenarios in which Player i will bid some value
that is possibly different from their belief Xi , we will denote the bid as bi .

2

Two-Player Game

Suppose we have two players each with an independent guess at the true price η
that is random, with P (Xi ≤ η) = 0.5 for i = 1, 2. The guess that is closest to
η wins the game (at this stage, we are not yet considering the TPiR penalty for
over-bidding). We assume Player 1, with no extra information outside their own
personal assessment, uses their guess X1 for their bid (b1 = X1 ). Player 2 bids after
Player 1.
Theorem 1. Let  > 0 be the closest Player 1 is allowed bid to X1 . Then Player
2 maximizes their chance of winning the game by bidding b2 = X1 +  if X1 < X2 ,
and will bid b2 = X1 −  if X2 < X1 . This strategy is consistent with “Proposition
1” for the behavior of a rational bidder in [3].
Proof. In the 3! = 6 possible orderings of (X1 , X2 , η), Player 1 wins in just two
of them: X2 < X1 < η and η < X1 < X2 . P (X1 > η, X2 > η) = 1/4 and
given both variables are larger than η, P (X1 > X2 ) = 1/2. The same holds for
(X1 < η, X2 < η), so that P (X2 < X1 < η) + P (η < X1 < X2 ) = 1/4.
The theorem does not hold without independence. For example, with η = 1/2
and joint density f (x1 , x2 ) = 4I(x2 < x1 < η) + 4I(η < x1 < x2 < 1), Player 1 wins
every time. Consider the dependent case where X1 and X2 are distributed normally:
X1 ∼ N (η, σ 2 ), X2 ∼ N (η, σ 2 ) and suppose that the bidders have (positively)
correlated evaluations. If Cov(X1 , X2 ) = ρσ 2 , we can use numeric integration to
evaluate P (X2 < X1 < η) + P (η < X1 < X2 ). If ρ > 0, the probability Player 1
wins goes from 1/4 up to 1/2 as ρ increases from zero to one. If ρ < 0, then by
symmetry the probability that Player 1 wins decreases down to zero as ρ decreases
to −1.
One may ask if Player 1 can increase the probability of winning by shifting
their bid away from X1 for the normal case. Figure 1 depicts the contours of the
5
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Figure 1: Two-bidder problem (x = X1 , y = X2 ): what happens if Player 1 bids
X1 + δ (where η = 0 and δ = +0.2 above) instead of X1 . Blue lines represent
contours of joint density, and the shaded area shows the regions in which Player 1
wins the auction.
bivariate distribution for X1 , X2 with correlation ρ = 1/2. The shaded area showing
the regions in which Player 1 can win the auction are shifted away from the origin
(0.2 units to the right in the figure), which necessarily decreases its probability for
any bivariate normal distribution with positive (finite) variances and |ρ| < 1. That
is, any shift in the bid from X1 to the left or right will necessarily decrease the
probability that is accumulated between the y-axis and the red-dotted line. This
provides a simple graphical proof that there is no potential gain in bidding some
amount either smaller or greater than X1 (without knowledge of Player 2’s bid).

Overbid Disqualification
If we incorporate the constraint that an overbid disqualifies the player, the optimal
bid process is more interesting. We will first consider how to optimize the bid of
Player 2, given that Player 1 bids at the assessed value. Theorem 2 below assumes
players have an independent and identically distributed belief distributions which
are not necessarily normal. In the theorem’s condition, note that if X1 and X2 are
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Figure 2: Joint bids at which Player 1 wins (B,D), Player 2 wins (A,E), or neither
player wins (C,F)
independent, then P (X2 < X1 < η) = 1/8.
Theorem 2. Suppose η is the median value of the belief distribution for both
players, and suppose P (X2 < X1 < η) is bounded above by 1/4. If Player 1 bids the
assessed value of b1 = X1 , then the optimal bid for Player 2 depends on whether X1
is larger than X2 . If X1 < X2 , then Player 2 should bid b2 = X1 + . If X2 < X1 ,
then Player 2 should bid b2 =  > 0.
Proof. There are 3!=6 possible arrangements of X1 , X2 , and η. They are labeled
on Figure 2 as
A. X1 < X2 < η

B. X1 < η < X2

C. η < X1 < X2

D. X2 < X1 < η

E. X2 < η < X1

F. η < X2 < X1

Let P2 be the winning probability for Player 2. It can be shown that if X1 < X2
(cases A,B,C), then P2 will increase (from P(A) to P(A ∪ B)) as Player 2’s bid
decreases from X2 down to X1 . Once decreased below X1 , P2 is zero, then increases
to P(B) as Player 2’s bid decreases to zero. In case X2 < X1 (cases D,E,F), P2
increases from P(E) to P(E ∪ F ) as Player 2’s bid decreases to zero. On the right,
7

it is maximized at X1 + , where P2 = P(D), which is strictly less than P(E ∪ F )
by assumption.
Normal Case: Suppose that Player 1 bids b1 = X1 , where Xi ∼ N (η, σ 2 ), i = 1, 2
with Corr(X1 , X2 ) = ρ. It is easy to show that if (X1 , X2 ) have a bivariate normal
distribution with zero mean, unit variance, and positive correlation coefficient ρ,
then
Z

∞

φ(t)Φ(at)dt,

α = P (X1 > 0, X2 > 0) =
0

where a = ρ/

p
1 − ρ2 , and (φ, Φ) are the density and cumulative distribution (re-

spectively) for the standard normal distribution.

If ρ > 0, this probability is

bounded by 1/4 ≤ α ≤ 1/2 as ρ increases from zero to one. At ρ = 1/2, for
example, α = 1/3. If we consider the six possible orderings of X1 , X2 , and the
actual value η, we see there is only one scenario (D) in where Player 1 can win if
Player 2 uses the optimal strategy. If ρ < 0, then we replace α with α̃ = 1/2 − α.
For example, if ρ = −1/2, then α̃ = 1/6. The inequalities above still hold with
0 ≤ α̃ ≤ 1/4.

3

Marginal Strategies for Four Bidders

The actual TPiR Contestants’ row game involves four players, and in this section
we will consider optimal strategies for each one. There is inherent advantage in
bidding after the other players, but in this section, we focus only on optimizing
each player’s chance of winning under the assumption that the other players are
bidding what they believe is the value of the item up for bid. That is, only one
bidder exhibits strategy. Although this approach may not be directly applicable
to most game show settings, where all four players typically use different strategies
simultaneously, it will illuminate some important effects of strategy for each player.
Players are allowed to bid within one dollar ( = 1) of a previous bid, and the
smallest possible bid is $1.00.
Theorem 3: Suppose that the player estimates (X1 ,X2 ,X3 ,X4 ) are independently
generated from the same distribution with median equal to the merchandise value.
8

If players bid their perceived value, the most frequent winner of the contest will be
the player with the second-smallest bid.
Proof. This result follows from binomial probabilities; for example, the probability
that all four bids are disqualified is (1/2)4 = 1/16. The probability that the smallest
bid wins the auction is the probability that exactly three bids out of four are over
the true value: 4(1/2)4 = 4/16. The probability that the second, third and fourthsmallest bids win, then, are 6/16, 4/16, 1/16, respectively.
With only four players, we have 4! = 24 possible orderings for (X1 , X2 , X3 , X4 ).
We will refer to any specific ordering using the short notation [1234], for example, to
represent the scenario X1 < X2 < X3 < X4 . With no other information besides the
observed ordering, this particular scenario would imply Player 1 has a 0.25 chance
to win, Player 2 has a 0.375 chance, and so on.
In this section we examine individual players exhibiting strategy (possibly bidding something other than their believed value based on the observed previous bids)
in order to maximize win probability. Results for all the strategies in this section
are based on changing one variable at a time, considering how the player’s believed
value compares to the other bids that have been observed by that time. For Player
2, there are two cases, three for Player 3, and four for Player 4. In some of the results
that follow, the potential improvement gained by bidding a value other than X will
be dependent on the distribution. In those cases, we treat (X1 , X2 , X3 , X4 ) as multivariate normal with identical mean η, constant variance V (Xi ) = σ 2 , i = 1, 2, 3, 4
and Cov(Xi , Xj ) = 0 for i 6= j. Later, we consider special models in which the
correlation between Xi and Xj is ρ 6= 0, for i 6= j.
In most cases, we consider scale shifts for a player’s bid because these allow the
player to invoke both the mean and variance of their belief distribution. However,
in some cases (e.g., Xi is below other players’ observed bids) it is more helpful
to consider a location shift that can be optimized in terms of variance alone (i.e.,
without the effect of the normal distribution location parameter).
Because only one player exhibits a strategy in each part of this section, we will
denote a previous player’s bid as xi instead of bi to emphasize this point. For
example, when Player 3 uses strategy to optimize their probability of winning, that
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player observes the previous two bids as x1 and x2 .

3.1

Marginal Strategy for Player 1

Player 1 has the least amount of information to use as strategy, so assuming the
players that follow will bid at their assessed value (X2 , X3 , X4 ), the only chance
Player 1 has to modify their winning probability is to shift this first bid from their
believed value of X1 . Without shifting, if the bids are uncorrelated, the winning
15 1
probabilities for all four players are all ( 16
)( 4 ) ≈ 0.234 (because the chance they all

overbid is 1/16 = 0.0625). However, if Player 1 shrinks their bid to a fraction of what
they believe the item is worth, it turns out they can improve their chances. Because
the effect depends on the underlying distribution, we use the normal assumptions
and consider a location shift.
Without loss of generality, suppose the other three bidders use belief distribution
Xi ∼ N (0, 1), i = 2, 3, 4, and Player 1 considers shrinking the bid by some δ > 0,
so the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Player 1’s bid is Φ1 (t) = Φ(t + δ).
Given X1 < 0, the conditional probability Player 1 wins by bidding b1 = X1 is equal
to the probability Xi ∈
/ (b1 , 0), i = 2, 3, 4, i.e., [1 − (Φ(0) − Φ(b1 ))]3 . By off-setting
the bid by δ, Player 1 can achieve win probability
Z

0

[1 − (Φ(0) − Φ(y))]3 φ1 (y)dy =

−∞



1 3
φ(y + δ)dy.
Φ(y) +
2
−∞

Z

0

It can be shown, numerically, that this win probability is maximized at δ = −0.712,
that is, by Player 1 bidding about 0.7 standard deviations under the believed value.
For Player 1 to implement such a strategy that depends on σ, they need to have
knowledge about their uncertainty in evaluating the merchandise up for bid. Suppose the value of the merchandise is $1000 and the belief distribution has standard
deviation σ = $100. In the optimal case in which the standard deviation is known,
Player 1 will shrink their bid by $71. Ascertaining σ 2 may not be straightforward,
as it does not pertain to the player’s uncertainty, but to the natural variability between independent bidders. Cause and effects regarding bidding uncertainty have
been studied [11], but estimation of variability in a player’s belief distribution is not
investigated in this paper.
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3.2

Marginal Strategy for Player 2

If the other players bid their believed value, it is not immediately clear what the
optimal strategy should be for Player 2. If X2 is just above x1 , it would make sense
for Player 2 to bid x1 + 1. If X2 far exceeds x1 , this might not seem to be the best
approach. On the other hand, if X2 < x1 , it might be better to shrink the bid,
especially if x1 and X2 are close in value. In this setting, compared to the realistic
game show setting, there are fewer potential consequences for bidding one dollar
because Player 3 does not have the option to bid one dollar more than Player 2.
This will change for multi-player strategies in the next section. Here, we consider
these two potential ways of improving the probability Player 2 wins: (a) shrink the
bid toward 0 in the case X2 < x1 , and (b) shrink back the bid toward x1 + 1 if
X2 > x1 .
In the case x1 < X2 , it can be shown that the optimal marginal strategy is to
bid x1 + 1. Given x1 < X2 , suppose there exists θ ∈ (0, 1) that maximizes the win
probability for the bid of x1 + θ(X2 − x1 ). Then the conditional win probability is
strictly decreasing as a function of θ for any belief distribution for which the median
matches the true merchandise value. The proof is relegated to the appendix. Table
1 in the appendix shows how the probability of winning increases from
to

39
96

17
96

= 0.177

= 0.406 if Player 2 bids a dollar over Player 1 in this case.

In the case X2 < x1 , the optimal shift depends on the belief distribution, which
we assume is normal. It can be shown that Player 2 can optimize win probability by
shifting their bid 0.439 standard deviations to the left of the perceived value. Win
probability initially increases from

7
48

= 0.146, and then returns back to

3
32

= 0.094

as the bid approaches one dollar. The proof is detailed in the appendix, and relies
on similar numeric integration used to prove the previous result.

3.3

Marginal Strategy for Player 3

Player 3 has more chances to optimize their bid given the available information from
the first two bidders. If we denote those bids according to their order (x1:2 < x2:2 ),
then there are three cases in which we search for an optimal way to modify their
believed value of X3 :
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a. If X3 < x1:2 , adjust the bid to θ3 X3 for some value of 0 ≤ θ3 ≤ 1.
b. If x1:2 < X3 < x2:2 , find the optimal value in between the first two bids:
x1:2 + λ3 (X3 − x1:2 ).
c. If x2:2 < X3 , find optimal bid value of the form x2:2 + (X3 − x2:2 )γ3 for some
γ3 > 0.
In case (a), if X3 is less than the previous bids, Player 3’s winning probability
is maximized by shrinking to the minimum (one dollar). Naturally, this only makes
sense in the context of the marginal strategy, knowing Player 4 will not bid $2 to
maximize their own chance of winning. In the appendix, we show that leaving the bid
as is, Player 3 wins in four equally likely scenarios (three in which X3 is the smallest
3
4
1
6
and one in which X4 < X3 ), so the probability of winning is ( 24
)( 16
) + ( 24
)( 16
)=
3
32

= 0.047. We show that if Player 3 bids X3 −δ, then winning probability increases

with δ, up to

1
8

= 0.125, which is the probability the other three players overbid

(and Player 3 will not overbid by bidding one dollar).
In case (b), when X3 is in between the previous two bids, Player 2 maximizes
the chance of winning by bidding x1:2 + 1. It is shown in the appendix that if Player
3 bids x1:2 + λ3 (X3 − x1:2 ), then the probability of winning is maximized at λ3 = 0.
At λ3 = 1, the win probability is 0.104, but increases to 0.177 as λ3 decreases to
zero.
In case (c), we want to find the optimal amount to bid above the previous
two bids. It turns out Player 3 will maximize winning probability in this case by
bidding x2:2 + 1, which one might expect. With a bid of X3 , there are 2 out of 24
scenarios in which Player 3 will have the second highest bid, and 6 out of 24 with
1
2
4
6
)( 16
) + ( 24
)( 16
)=
the highest bid, so the probability of winning would be ( 24

7
192

= 0.036. If Player 3 bids one dollar more than x2:2 , the second highest bid now
has a 10/16 chance of winning. Depending on X4 , the probabilities of winning with
the highest bid are either 6/16 or 1/4, and the probability of winning increases to
10
4
4
2
6
2
)( 16
) + ( 24
)( 16
) + ( 24
)( 16
)=
( 24

1
8

= 0.125. Using the same approach as case (b), it

can be shown that the winning probability increases as Player 3’s bid shrinks toward
x2:2 .
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3.4

Marginal Strategy for Player 4

In the fourth case, we assume the first three contestants bid their believed value
(i.e., there is no strategy exhibited in the first three bids). There are no bids to
follow, so this case is the easiest to directly optimize. Given the bidding behavior of
the contestants, Player 4 might consider bidding just above the highest competitive
bid that the player deems is not overbid (Proposition 1 from [3]). We will call this
Strategy I. For example, if X4 is the second-highest value of the four, then Player
4 will bid just above the third highest. Using this tactic, we can show Player 4 will
win the game with probability 0.470.
Consider alternative naı̈ve Strategy II where Player 4 simply bids just above the
highest bid. Using Strategy II, the winning probability is reduced to 0.130. Note
that Strategy II would be more successful in a setting in which the first three bidders
use strategy. In that case they are likely to underbid more due to the severe penalty
for overbidding. We can show, using the same approach as before, that Strategy I
maximizes the probability of winning for Player 4. The proof follows directly from
the proofs for the other marginal strategies in the appendix.
Figure 3 shows how the winning probabilities change as a function of (positive)
correlation. At some point (near ρ = 0.785), if the contestants’ guesses are correlated
enough, the second strategy is actually better. However, as correlation becomes
more negative, Strategy I winning probability increases (up to 0.5) and Strategy II
probability further decreases.

3.5

Summary of Marginal Strategies

Four players generate independent random evaluations X1 , X2 , X3 , X4 of merchandise valued at η, with P (Xi < η) = 0.5 and V (Xi ) = σ 2 . In each case below, one
player (Player i) exhibits a strategy that allows them to bid a value other than Xi .
1. Assuming Xi ∼ N (η, σ 2 ), Player 1 maximizes winning probability by bidding
x1 − 0.712σ.
2. For Player 2, who observes the first bid as x1 , if X2 > x1 , win probability
is maximized by bidding x1 + 1. If X2 < x1 , Player 2 maximizes winning
probability by bidding x1 − 0.439σ (based on normal assumptions).
13
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Figure 3: Probability Player 4 wins (as ρ goes from 0 to 1) for two strategies. The
blue line is for Strategy I. The red line is for Strategy II. They have equal probability
at ρ= 0.79.
3. For Player 3, who observes bids ordered x1:2 < x2:2 , probability of winning is
maximized by bidding one dollar if X3 < x1:2 . If x1:2 < X3 < x2:2 , Player 3
should bid x1:2 + 1, and if x2:2 < X3 , the bid should be x2:2 + 1.
4. Player 4 maximizes win probability by bidding a dollar more than the largest
bid under X4 , and by bidding a dollar if X4 is smaller than the three previous
bids.

4

Conditional Player Strategies

In this section we present a more practical assessment of the “Items up for bid” game
on TPiR in which all players use strategies simultaneously. The marginal strategies
presented in the previous section do not offer promising remedies for players to
exploit, but they serve as a foundation to the more applicable bidding solutions
presented here. In this case, we will use the empirical results from simulations
to suggest the optimal bid for any player, when necessary. Previous bids are not
necessarily the same as that player’s belief, so they will be more correctly labeled
bi rather than xi . For Player 4, the strategy will remain the same because there are
no actions by the other players to follow the last bid. That is, the marginal strategy
of Player 4 in the previous section is identical to the conditional strategy in this
framework.
14

For the other players, we will consider different modifications of their believed
value and search to find which bid turns out to be optimal after players that follow
react to that bid. Player 3 will bid based on knowing the bids of Players 1 and 2,
but we will determine their optimal bids based on how the auction turns out after
all four players have bid. For example, we found that if X2 > b1 , the best marginal
strategy for Player 2 was to bid b1 + 1. But if we base the bid choice on results in
which all four players use strategy, Player 2 will bid more than b1 + 1, as we might
expect.
We consider the basic conditional strategy for all four players using the following
approach:
(a) Player 4 uses the same marginal strategy that maximizes their winning probability based on observing the three previous bids.
(b) Player 3 will construct a bid based on observing the first two bids, but also
based on which bid turns out to be most successful given the strategy exhibited
by Player 4.
(c) Player 2 constructs a bid based on observing the first bid and optimizes it by
considering various bids and finding which one maximizes winning probability
given the strategies shown by Player 3 in (b) and Player 4 in (a).
(d) Player 1 adjusts their bid (away from their believed value X1 ) according to
simulation results that maximize their chance of winning, given the strategies
of the three players that bid subsequently.
Each player’s conditional strategy uses the actual bid of the previous players, so
it does not matter if those other players are bidding their actual belief or if they are
bidding a lesser value in order to avoid the risk of overbidding. We next consider
the conditional strategies for the first three players, based on how modifying their
bid changes winning probability in light of the player decisions that follow their bid.

4.1

Conditional Strategy for Player 3

We return to consider the optimal strategy for Player 3, now based on simulation
results, given that Player 4 uses the optimal strategy described in Section 3. The
15

set up is the same as before: there are three cases in which we can find a best way
to modify their believed value of X3 based on the other two ordered bids (b1:2 , b2:2 )
observed by Player 3:
a. If X3 < b1:2 , adjust the bid to θ3 X3 for some value of 0 ≤ θ3 ≤ 1.
b. If b1:2 < X3 < b2:2 , find the optimal value in between the first two bids:
b1:2 + λ3 (X3 − b1:2 ).
c. If b2:2 < X3 , find the optimal bid value of the form b2:2 + (X3 − b2:2 )γ3 for
some γ3 > 0.
The previous (marginal) results were based on Player 4 bidding the believed value
X4 . In this case, where Player 4 uses an optimal strategy, the results will be different.
The following results are based on 1,000,000 simulations. In case (a), if X3 is
less than the previous bids, then Player 3’s winning probability is maximized at θ3
= 0.963, so their best chance of winning will be to bid b3 = 0.963X3 . In case (b),
when X2 is in between the previous two bids, Player 2 maximizes the chance of
winning at λ3 = 0.249, so the bid will be b1:2 + 0.249(X3 − b1:2 ). In case (c), Player
3 will still maximize winning probability in this case by bidding b2:2 + 1 (winning
probability is a decreasing function of γ3 ).

4.2

Conditional Strategy for Player 2

Next, we reconsider the optimal bids for Player 2, who will bid based on observing
only the result of the first bidder. If we use the same framework as before, then we
are looking for values of
a. If X2 < b1 , change the bid to θ2 X2 for some value of 0 ≤ θ2 ≤ 1.
b. If b1 < X2 , find the optimal value of γ2 and bid b1 + γ2 (X2 − b1 )
Results are based on 1,000,000 simulations. For case (a), Player 2 increases the winning probability by shrinking the bid. In this case, simulation shows it is minimized
at θ2 = 0.975, so Player 2 will bid 97.5% of their believed value if it is below the
observed bid by Player 1. In the case b1 < X2 , it is now more profitable to bid
more than just over the previous bidder. Player 2 will maximize the overall winning
probability by bidding γ2 = 0.345 standard deviations over the first bidder.
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4.3

Conditional Strategy for Player 1

Finally, when all the other players are using optimal strategies, Player 1 can maximize his or her chance of winning by bidding some value b1 = θ1 X1 . Using the
previous marginal strategy, we determined that the probability of winning was maximized by bidding about 0.71 standard deviations under the perceived value. In this
scenario where the bidders following Player 1 will also adjust their bidding behavior,
simulation shows Player 1 will maximize winning probability by bidding 97.5% of
the believed value.

4.4

Simulation Results Based on Conditional Strategies

Given that the four players each produce independent random evaluations X1 , X2 ,
X3 , X4 of merchandise valued at η, the best conditional strategies for each player
are as follows:
1. Assuming Xi ∼ N (η, σ 2 ), Player 1 maximizes the win probability by bidding
0.975X1 .
2. For Player 2, who observes the first bid as b1 , if X2 > b1 , then the win
probability is maximized by bidding b1 + 0.345(X2 − b1 ). If X2 < b1 , then
Player 2 maximizes winning probability by bidding 0.975X2 .
3. For Player 3, who observes bids ordered b1:2 < b2:2 , the probability of winning
is maximized by 0.963X3 . If b1:2 < X3 < b2:2 , then Player 3 should bid
b1:2 + 0.249(X3 − b1:2 ), and if b2:2 < X3 , the bid should be b2:2 + 1.
4. Player 4 maximizes win probability by bidding a dollar more than the largest
bid under X4 , and by bidding a dollar if X4 is smaller than the three previous
bids.
If all four players use conditional strategies, Player 4 still comes out with a
large advantage, winning over half the time (P1 = 0.075, P2 = 0.116, P3 = 0.216,
P4 = 0.569). These results are based on 10,000,000 simulations. We will compare
and contrast the three different strategies discussed thus far in the final discussion
section. In the next section, we consider how player uncertainty changes the strategy
for an optimal bid.
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5

Additional Player Strategies

The models from the last two sections illuminate how any player can aim to improve their probability of winning by modifying their bid according to the past bids
they observe. In this section, we examine how the effect of player uncertainty (or
confidence) affects the outcome of the auction. We first consider a group of four
bidders, each with a distribution that describes their belief about the value of the
item up for auction. If the true value is η, then the ith bidder will value the item
at Xi ∼ N (η, σ 2 ), so σ 2 represents the natural variability that reflects error in their
personal assessment of the item up for sale. But the bidder also has a confidence
in their bid which is characterized by another variance component δ 2 ; their belief is
characterized by Yi ∼ N (Xi , δ 2 ).
For example, if the fourth bidder has observed three bids (b1 , b2 , b3 ), they will
attempt to optimize their bid by maximizing their chance of winning using their
belief distribution. That is, they will choose b4 so that they have the best chance of
winning, assuming the true value of the item is X4 , but knowing they will not win
the auction if they overbid, which is influenced by δ 2 .

5.1

Example with Belief Distribution

Suppose there are four bidders, with b1 = 386, b2 = 426, and b3 = 502. The fourth
bidder has a belief distribution Y4 ∼ N (420, 502 ). That is, X4 = 420 and δ = 50.
Because they are the last bidder, their optimal bid will be 1, 387, 427, or 503.
Recall with the naı̈ve strategy, Player 4 would bid 503, and the optimal marginal or
conditional strategy is a bid of 387.
According to Player 4’s belief uncertainty, if they bid 1 dollar, then the probability they win is equal to the probability the true value of the item up for bids is
below 418, which they believe is P (Y4 < 386) = 0.25. If they bid 387, then they
believe the probability they will win to be P (386 < Y3 < 426) = 0.30. If they bid
427, P (426 < Y4 < 503) = 0.40, and if they bid 503, P (Y3 > 502) = 0.05. Using
their uncertainty to optimize the bid, Player 4 believes they have the best chance
of winning by bidding 427.
This example shows how the fourth player optimizes strategy according to their
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Figure 4: Win probability for Player 4 as a function of variability and uncertainty.
own belief system. But if that belief was also randomly generated (along with the
beliefs of the other players), the true probability of winning the game might be
different from 0.40 given b4 = 427. Assume for now that the first three bids are
relatively close to each bidder’s evaluation. If η = 510 and σ = 100, then generating
(X1 , X2 , X3 , X4 ) = (386, 426, 502, 420) is not an unreasonable Monte Carlo outcome,
but despite Player 4’s optimized game plan, Player 3 would be the auction winner.
Figure 4 shows how the information variance (σ 2 ) and belief confidence (with
variance component δ 2 ) affects the probability that Player 4 wins. As σ 2 increases,
Player 4’s win probability increases. The less information garnered by the players
allows Player 4 to have increasing leverage by bidding last. However, as the player’s
belief confidence decreases (δ 2 increases) the win probability starts to goes down,
but is not strictly decreasing. In this example, Player 4 seems to do best when
the variability between players is some fixed amount larger than the variability that
characterizes player confidence.
The belief distribution could be used by the other players in order to increase
their own win probability, including helping them in anticipating the next player’s
bid. As a simple example, suppose X3 = 420, Y3 ∼ N (X3 , 502 ), and the previous
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bids are b1 = 536 and b2 = 551. In this case, Player 3 need not be concerned
about the previous bids, since they are deemed to grossly overvalue the merchandise
(P (Y4 > 536) = 0.01). Player 3 has the choice to bid one dollar, but at the obvious
risk that Player 4 would bid $2. Player 3 wants to find the optimal bid b3 that
anticipates the bid by Player 4, attempting to ensure Player 4 cannot achieve an
overwhelming win probability by either bidding b4 = 1 or b4 = b3 + 1.
Perhaps the best Player 3 can do is to assume Player 4 has the identical belief
distribution, and therefore find a bid b3 that splits P (0 < Y3 < b3 ) and P (b3 < Y3 <
b1 ). Assuming Player 4 is rational, they will choose based on which either one is
maximized, so Player 3 optimizes them by making them close to equal, in this case
around b3 = 420. On the other hand, assumptions about your opponents’ rationality
may be unjustified! Perhaps entering a larger bid would avoid the asymmetric loss
incurred if Player 4 chooses to bid b3 + 1 despite having a higher expected gain
bidding b4 = 1. For example, Player 3 can still secure a 40% chance of winning by
bidding b3 = 433 and inducing Player 4 to bid one dollar.

6

Discussion

In this paper we have outlined optimal strategies for the bidding players on Contestants’ Row during the game show “The Price is Right”. The fundamental two-player
strategies discussed in the introduction set the framework for constructing optimal
marginal and conditional bids for the four-player game. We model player-to-player
uncertainty using a random distribution with median equaling the merchandise
value. Some of the optimal bidding strategies work for all possible distributions,
but some results (e.g., when a player’s bid is lower than a previous bid, but another
player bids after that player) are distribution dependent, and we used the normal
distribution to illustrate.
The asymmetry of the game leads to highly unequal outcome probabilities that
greatly favor the last bidder. Figure 5 aggregates the outcomes for the three bidding schemes we considered: (a) the naı̈ve strategy in which everyone bids their
perceived value, (b) the marginal strategy, in which every player optimizes under
the assumption that other players will bid their perceived value, and (c) the con-
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Figure 5: Player win probabilities for different strategies
ditional strategy, in which players try to optimize their bid based on simulation
outcomes that rely on other bidders using strategy. The middle bar in Figure 5
shows what happens if every player uses a marginal strategy, ignoring the fact that
other players are potentially bidding something other than their perceived value.
Such a strategy is catastrophic for every player except the last bidder, as one might
expect. While each player using conditional strategy works to maximize their own
win probability, Figure 5 shows the probability of all players overbidding is also
reduced 2.5 times (from 6.25% down to 2.5%).
In the previous section, we modeled player strategies based on their own acknowledged uncertainty in the value of the merchandise up for bid. It turns out
that this additional uncertainty can significantly alter a player’s bid strategy. This
model framework with two variable components also allows other players to consider
bids that reflect an opponent’s uncertainty.
The asymmetric loss in this study does not represent typical auctions observed in
business and industry, but it does provide further information about how rational
bidders can adapt their bidding behavior to incorporate new auction constraints.
While few studies have investigated the rational decision theory observed in TPiR
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since Bennett and Hickman [1] and Berk et al.[3], these results can provide a benchmark for future studies that study empirical results for asymmetric auctions, such
as Estelami [4], Hendricks and Porter [6], and Perrigne and Vuong [11].
Although most of the results in this paper focus on players that generate independent assessments of the merchandise, the TPiR game set up is sure to induce
correlations between bids. While this limits the dominion of our results, it also suggests an avenue for potential research. For example, data from TPiR episodes will
not reveal the bidding intentions of the game-show players. A separate study would
probably be needed to show bias in a player’s perception of merchandise value. However, data may reveal effects of “anchoring” among player bids. Anchoring refers to
the human tendency to rely too heavily on an initial piece of information, such as
a previous bid, when making decisions. For example, we might conjecture that the
second bidder is more likely to bid below the merchandise value if the first bidder
grossly undervalues the item up for bid.
Overall, results show that significant gains can be won by players who take
advantage of the unique rules of the “Items up for bid” segment on The Price is
Right. It was relatively straightforward to show how the last player can optimize
their chance of winning, but this paper showed that the other three players can also
augment their bids to significantly increase their chance of winning.

Appendix
Player Two Marginal Strategy when X1 < X2
In the case X1 < X2 , it can be shown the optimal strategy is to bid X1 + 1. To
prove this we consider the twelve equally likely orderings of the four bidders given
X1 < X2 . In half of those scenarios (e.g., [1234]) it is plain to see that the win
probability for Player 2 is maximized if Player 2 bids the minimum amount larger
than X1 . For example, with [1234], Player 2 already has a 6/16 chance of winning
(the binomial probability that two of four bids are larger than the target value and
two are less). By shrinking to X1 + 1 (with no exhibited strategy from Player 3
and Player 4), that chance goes up 4/16 (the binomial probability that three bids
are larger than the target and one is smaller), so that the probability of winning
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increases to 10/16.
Given X1 < X2 , suppose there exists θ ∈ (0, 1) that minimizes Player 2’s win
probability based on bidding X1 + θ(X2 − X1 ). If we designate the order statistics
for (X1 , X2 , X3 , X4 ) as X1:4 < X2:4 < X3:4 < X4:4 , the twelve possible orderings are
listed in the table below, along with the conditional win probabilities for Player 2
(P0 = probability of winning with the original bid versus P1 = probability of winning
by bidding at X1 + 1). The final column lists the conditional win probability for
Player 2 as a function of θ, where Player 2’s bid is X1 +θ(X2 −X1 ). Aggregating the
P0 column (and dividing by 12) we find that the conditional probability of Player 2
winning, given X1 < X2 , is 0.177. By bidding X1 + 1 instead of X2 , that conditional
probability increases to 0.406.
Table 1: Conditional win probabilities for Player 2 under the 12 equally likely
orderings in which X1 < X2 .
X1:4
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
4
4
4

X2:4
2
2
3
3
4
4
1
1
4
1
1
3

X3:4
3
4
2
4
2
3
2
4
1
2
3
1

X4:4
4
3
4
2
3
2
4
2
2
3
2
2

P0

P1

6
16
6
16
4
16
1
16
4
16
1
16
4
16
1
16
1
16
4
16
1
16
1
16

10
16
10
16
4
16
4
16
4
16
4
16
10
16
6
16
5
16
10
16
5
16
6
16

P(Win |θ)
4 + 6(1 − θ)
4 + 6(1 − θ)
4 + 4θ ln(θ) − 6(1 − θ) ln(1 − θ)
4 − 4θ2 + 8θ ln(θ)
4 + 4θ ln(θ) − 6(1 − θ) ln(1 − θ)
4 − 4θ2 + 8θ ln(θ)
4 + 6(1 − θ)
1 + 5(1 − θ) + 6θ ln(θ) − 4(1 − θ) ln(1 − θ)
1 + 4(1 − θ)
4 + 6(1 − θ)
1 + 5(1 − θ) + 6θ ln(θ) − 4(1 − θ) ln(1 − θ)
1 + 4(1 − θ)

To compute conditional win probabilities for the bid X1 + θ(X2 − X1 ) as a
function of θ, we can assume Xi ∼ U (0, 1) without loss of generality, so that the
probability change is linear between X1 and X2 . In the case X3 and/or X4 are
between X1 and X2 , we average over one uniform variable, or (in the case [1342], for
example) we average over two order statistics (U1:2 , U2:2 ). For example, in the case
[1324], we first condition on X3 = t and find P (W in|X3 = t) = 4(1 − θ/t) if θ < t,
and P (W in|X3 = t) = 4 + 6(1 − θ)/(1 − t) if t < θ < 1. Adding up the conditional
probabilities in the last column (each weighted with 1/12 probability), we have
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P (W in|θ) =

78 − 44θ − 5θ2 − 2(1 − θ)(17 − 3θ) ln(1 − θ) + 6θ(6 + θ) ln(θ)
.
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This probability is strictly less than 39/96 for θ > 0 and converges to the original
win probability (0.177) as θ increases to one.

Player Two Marginal Strategy when X2 < X1
Without loss of generality, suppose players use belief distribution Xi ∼ N (0, 1),
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, and Player 2 considers shrinking the bid by some δ > 0, so the CDF
of Player 2’s bid is Φ2 (t) = Φ(t + δ). Given X2 < X1 , for Player 2 to win, we need
X2 < δ, X1 > 0, and both X3 and X4 not in the interval (X2 − δ, 0). These last two
conditional probabilities are denoted

Q21 (x2 ) = 1 − [Φ(0) − Φ(x2 − δ)] = Φ(x2 − δ) +

1
2

when x2 < δ, otherwise Q21 (x2 ) = 0. Including only the scenarios in which X2 < X1 ,
the probability of Player 2 winning is

Z

δ

Z

∞

Z

2

δ

Z

x1

Q21 (x2 ) φ(x2 )φ(x1 )dx2 dx1 +
−∞

δ

1
=
2

0

Z

δ
2

δ

Z



Q21 (x2 ) φ(x2 )dx2 −
−∞

0

Q21 (x2 )2 φ(x2 )φ(x1 )dx2 dx1 .

−∞

1
Φ(x2 ) −
2



Q21 (x2 )2 φ(x2 )dx2 .

By numeric integration, it can be shown this function is maximized at 0.439.

Player Three Marginal Strategy when X3 < X1 < X2
We may express P (X3 < X1 < X2 ) =

R

Ω0 (312) f (x)dx,

where f (x) =

Q4

i=1 f (xi )dxi

is the density function for X = (X1 , X2 , X3 , X4 ) and Ω0 (312) is the set −∞ < x3 <
x1 < x2 < ∞, −∞ < x4 < ∞.
Without loss of generality, let Xi ∼ N (0, 1) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. If Player 3 offsets
the bid by δ, then the probability Player 3 wins in this scenario is P (Ωδ (312)) =
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R
Ωδ (312)

Q4

i=1 f (xi )dxi

where Ωδ (312) is the set

{x3 ∈ (−∞, δ)} ∩ {x2 ∈ R+ } ∩ {x1 ∈ (0, x2 )} ∩ {x4 ∈ (−∞, x3 ) ∪ (0, ∞)}
With δ = 0, the probability Player 3 wins with this particular order can be
deduced using binomial probabilities (as before). There are 3 out of 24 equally likely
orderings in which x3 is the smallest bid out of four, and one out of 24 in which
3
4
x3 is the second smallest [4312], so the probability of winning would be ( 24
)( 16
)+
1
6
( 24
)( 16
)=

3
32

= 0.047. It is also easy to show that P (Ωδ (312)) is increasing in δ,

and levels off at

1
8

= 0.125, which is the probability the other three players overbid.

Player Three Marginal Strategy when X1 < X3 < X2
If θ ∈ (0, 1), we consider the bid X1 + θ(X3 − X1 ). If θ = 1, and Player 3 uses X3 as
the bid, then there are four out of 24 scenarios in which X3 is the second smallest
bid (win probability = 6/16) and four in which X3 is third smallest (win probability
6
4
4
4
)( 16
) + ( 24
)( 16
) =
= 4/16), so Player 3’s win probability in this case is ( 24

5
48

=

0.104.
In this case, it can be shown that the win probability increases as θ decreases to
zero. Using the same assumptions as in the previous proof, let Ωθ (132) be the set
of bids in which Player 3 wins. Then Ωθ (132) is defined as
{x1 ∈ R− }∩{x2 ∈ R+ }∩{x3 ∈ (x1 ,

−(1 − θ)x1
−(1 − θ)x1
)}∩{x4 ∈ (−∞,
)∪(0, ∞)}.
θ
θ

Because g(t) = (1 − t)/t is strictly decreasing in 0 < t < 1, this area is strictly
increasing as θ decreases from one to zero.
Specifically, Figure 6 shows how we integrate over more area (for X1 , X3 ) as θ
decreases from one to zero, where the entire quadrant x1 < 0, x3 > 0 is included. As
θ approaches 0, and Player 3 bids the minimum amount over X1 , the probability of
2
4
6
)( 10
winning increases to ( 24
16 ) + ( 24 )( 16 ) =

25

17
968

= 0.177.
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Figure 6: Increasing domain in (X1 , X3 ) as θ goes from 1 (dark blue) to 3/4, 1/2,
and 1/4 (lightening shades of blue)
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